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aBstract
The Arab Spring raised high expectations for political freedom, especially for situ-
ations in which the rapid development of ICT intersects with political oppression 
and rebellion, as was the case in Mali, West Africa. In 2012 the country’s north-
ern part fell into the hands of ‘rebels’ and jihadists were on the rise. This article 
tries to understand the development of political agency in relation to the unprec-
edented access to new ICT of the Fulani nomads and urbanites in the Mopti region 
(Hayre), who engage increasingly with new actors and networks present in the war 
zone: ‘rebels’ and jihadists; the diaspora from that region; and the journalistic and 
academic communities who visit the region. We argue that political agency is emerg-
ing in the relation between (newly appearing) information networks in both the on- 
and off-line worlds. These networked societies are embedded in cultural and social 
historical specificities of the Sudan-Sahel zone in conflict. 
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	 1.	 For	a	description	of	
the	Fulani	in	the	Hayre,	
see	De	Bruijn	and	Van	
Dijk	(1995);	for	the	
Hayre	diaspora,	see	
Pelckmans	(2011).
IntroductIon
The first news about the Mali conflict of 2012 came to us through telephonic 
communication with a person in Paris; second was the website of one of the 
main rebel ‘movements’ that led this war; and third were the phone calls we 
received from friends from the Northern Mali area. In a few weeks’ time, 
Facebook pages where news on the situation was exchanged by people from 
Azawad, Bamako, the United States, Europe and the Malian diaspora else-
where in Africa. In contrast, in the 1990s, a similar rebellion in Northern Mali 
did not have such exposure and there was hardly any communication with the 
outside world. 
The central question for this article is how ICTs have influenced commu-
nication (frequency, but also content) about the conflict in Northern Mali and 
how these information flows have influenced the political communication and 
networks of actors in the region and beyond, influencing their room for politi-
cal agency. This article focuses on communication in the 2012 period, which 
was the most intensive period of the war for the region of study, the Hayre, 
with its main city and market town Douentza (see Figure 1). 
We concentrate on the position of the (semi)nomadic (cattle herding) 
Fulani and their diaspora,1 during 2012, i.e. the period when the northern 
Figure 1: The Hayre area in the Mopti region of Central Mali. 
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 2. See https://
mobileafricarevisited.
wordpress.com; Keita 
2013a, 2013b; Ag Rissa 
2009; Sangare 2009.
part of Mali was ‘occupied’ and had become a ‘no-go area’ for foreigners. 
We try to understand how these Fulani are linked to the different circuits of 
information that were created with the help of the new ICTs and how these 
different information circuits led them into new political networks and infor-
mation and how this influenced their political agency both off- and online.
The interplay between new ICTs and the digitalization of communica-
tion (mobile telephony, Internet, social media) creates new social and political 
spaces, where (new) voices/actors can have a place and generate new (infor-
mation and social) networks and political agency. With this empirical case 
study of Mali 2012 we contribute to a better understanding of this new politi-
cal space, which is still a field to be explored (Georgiadou et al. 2013). The first 
studies in this field were based on case studies in the Western world, Latin 
America and the United States. These regions were the frontiers for Internet 
connectivity and access to social media. Rheingold’s 2002 analysis of smart 
mobs is now a classic. Sub-Saharan Africa is only now, in 2014, more or less 
really connected. Communication is Power (Castells 2009). However, access 
to communication is not the same for everybody. The ability to act politically 
is related to rules of access that follow hierarchies and inequalities in society. 
Political agency is the space an individual can create to act politically and to 
develop ideas within these structural constraints (Chabal 2009). Such agency 
is now reformulated in the on- and off line spaces that new ICTs provide. 
Central to the discussion is how the on- and offline political spaces interact. 
Although both off- and online communication can be digital, we distin-
guish between them as follows. With online communication, we mean here 
the interactional spaces that are created through written texts on internet 
forums (such as Facebook) that can be accessed on different technological 
devices (computer or smartphone). We distinguish this from off line commu-
nication, which is mediated by voice, gestures or face-to-face interaction. 
Although offline interaction is also supported by digital technology (a phone, 
for example), off line activity has a clear physical component (interactions 
through voice, gestures or movement). Offline communication is thus, for 
example, the radio, travelling and talking drums (see Gleick 2011). Of course 
both spaces also interact and Skype is a typical example of where offline 
face-to-face voice exchange is combined with online interaction of written 
chat messages. Increasingly, typical offline actions (voice communication, 
meetings) find their way into the online communities, and vice versa. It is in 
these spaces of interaction that we expect to find new dynamics of political 
agency. 
A few studies have addressed the link between media and conflict for 
the case of Mali, but these mainly focus on the situation in Bamako. This is 
the case, for example, for the discussion on rumours and perceptions of the 
conflict by Gavelle et al. (2013) and the analysis of the role of media in the 
public debates following the coup in Bamako in 2012 by Hagberg and Körling 
(2012). This article focuses on the use of media on the ground in the war 
zone itself and connections between people in the field with the diaspora. In 
general, the Hayre can be considered relatively remote and disconnected in 
terms of modern communication, tarred roads, and other types of access to 
and from it. Since 2009, mobile telephony and Internet have become increas-
ingly accessible in urban zones and in some rural areas.2 One of the (semi-) 
nomadic groups in the area, the Fulani, have a long history of networking and 
mobility, and as such they have always been strong in communication over 
space and in social networks (see de Bruijn 2007). The Mali conflict, which 
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	 3.	 The	data	we	obtained	
resulted	from	our	
long-standing	
relationship	with	
networks	of	people	in	
and	from	the	region.	
Mirjam	de	Bruijn	has	
been	working	in	the	
region	since	1987.	Her	
main	focus	was	on	
understanding	Fulani	
society	and	the	various	
ecological	crises	it	
underwent.	After	her	
M.A.	research	in	1987,	
she	did	her	Ph.D.	field	
research	in	1990–1992,	
and	her	postdoctoral	
research	in	1997,	and	
has	returned	to	the	
region	for	various	
research	projects	on	
a	regular	basis	(in	
collaboration	with	
Professor	Han	van	
Dijk).	Lotte	Pelckmans	
started	her	research	
in	the	region	with	
sedentarized	Fulani	
in	2001,	which	she	
expanded	with	Ph.D.	
research	in	2005–2007	
and	with	fieldwork	
among	the	Malian	
diaspora	communities	
in	France.	Boukary	
Sangare	did	his	M.A.	
thesis	research	in	
the	region	in	2009	
and	returned	for	a	
second	Masters	in	
2012–2013.	He	began	
a	Ph.D.	project	on	the	
topic	and	region	in	the	
summer	of	2014.
	 4.	 De	Bruijn	and	
Sangare	2012;	Sangare	
2012a,	2012b,	2012c;	
Pelckmans	2015.
	 5.	 One	can	think	of	the	
evolving	descriptions	
of	ethnographic	
research	methods	for	
online	research;	with	
mobile	phones,	see,	for	
example,	Pelckmans	
(2009);	with	the	
Internet,	see,	among	
others,	Underberg	and	
Zorn	(2013),	Horst	and	
Miller	(2012)	and	Hine	
(2000).
manifested itself most strongly in 2012, inhibited mobility, introduced new 
actors in the region, and generated insecurity. 
In this article we question where political agency emerges in the interac-
tion between new ICT landscapes and war, such as in the case of Central Mali. 
Does the new political online space have offline effects (see Fahlenbrach et al. 
2014a; de Bruijn et al. 2013)? What is the interplay between networked spaces, 
increased communication possibilities and war dynamics in this specific case? 
Do new political voices emerge? What role is played by the creation of the 
new or recent appearance of online space and visibility? 
This article will not go into the details of the conflict and war in Mali but 
will outline the groups that provide or consume information with the help 
of new ICTs. This requires a short introduction to the changes in the Malian 
landscapes of media and politics. The next section will delve into the different 
information networks that circle around the nomads, and then we will relate 
our findings to some of the challenging ideas on the relation between ICT, 
networks, information flows and political agency from the literature. We will 
conclude with a discussion on the relation between ICT spaces and changes in 
political agency in warzone Mali, 2012. 
Setting the Scene: the hayre in conflict in 2012
Researching political and social dynamics  
in Hayre’s war year, 2012
Having trust relationships has been crucial for our research in the region 
during this war period. Our long involvement in the region and the friend-
ships we have developed made us develop such trust relations with our 
informants.3 We have all recently been to Mali for follow-up research: Mirjam 
visited Bamako in June 2012, and Lotte was in Bamako in February 2012, 
December 2013 and August 2014. Boukary undertook short field trips to the 
region while it was still occupied by militants in April and November 2012; he 
returned in August 2013 and again in August 2014, which resulted in several 
(online) publications about the conflict through the eyes of people living 
in the Douentza area (De Bruijn and Sangare 2012; Sangare 2012a, 2012b, 
2012c).4
Our approach is qualitative. Through a deep understanding of and close-
ness to our main informants, we try to understand their ideas and moments 
of crucial decision making. These biographic data are contextualized with the 
help of interviews and (participant) observation data. We also include the 
virtual world as a research site, by following websites and Facebook groups 
with restricted access, and engaging in telephone conversations.5 We are 
therefore ourselves active agents in this online world. The division of work was 
related to the possibility of entering the region. Mirjam and Lotte as foreigners 
had to stick to working in the virtual realm and visiting Bamako. Boukary, as a 
Malian and Fulani, could go to the Hayre region several times and conducted 
interviews with informants of both Mirjam’s and Lotte’s networks. 
The advance of mobile telephony and the Internet 
Mali’s capital, Bamako, was connected, at least theoretically, for the majority 
of its inhabitants through wireless technology in 2002. The interior received 
wireless technology only in 2006/2007. To be more specific, some of Northern 
Mali’s towns have had connectivity since 2005/2006, while other smaller towns 
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 6. We will focus on 
the situation in 
the Hayre region 
without explaining 
in detail the causes 
and consequences of 
the crisis. For more 
on this, see Boas and 
Torheim (2013); Cold-
Ravnkilde (2013); Lacher 
and Tull (2013); Lecocq 
et al. (2013); Boas (2012); 
and Lacher (2012).
 7. The MNLA or 
Mouvement National 
pour la liberation de 
l’Azawad, is headed by 
freedom fighters and/
or separatists, mainly 
with Tuareg origins in 
the Kidal region.
 8. See also Sangare 
(2013b), Figures 4 
and 5. (http://www.
connecting-in-
times-of-duress.nl/
wp-content/uploads/
m%C3%A9moire-
Master-2-sociologie-
UCAD-Boukary-
SANGARE-080314.pdf).
 9. Interview by Boukary 
Sangare with law 
student Paate Tambura 
in Boni (Douentza),  
19 November 2012.
 10. See ‘Mali: les islamistes 
contrôlent désormais 
la totalité du nord du 
pays’,  AFP Bamako, 11 
July 2012, published 
on tv5 website: http://
www.tv5.org/cms/
chaine-francophone/
info/p-1911-nord-
du-mali-la-rebellion-
touareg-en-deroute-
quitte-tombouctouhtm
?rub=6&xml=newsmlm
md.f0e7ee1a46b7db0a
3fc7a7b8a57a6566.3e1.
xml.
 11. Since many of the 
MNLA rebels are 
natives of Douentza 
region, they could 
easily flee and hide 
themselves in the 
‘bush’.
 12. Administrative 
void because all 
governmental officers 
had fled and left the 
area early in April after 
its conquest by the 
MNLA.
were connected from 2009 onwards. However, the bulk of surrounding rural 
areas was connected only in 2012/2013, when the ‘occupation’ of Northern 
Mali was a reality. National mobile phone coverage was a maximum of 30 
per cent in 2009. We have no figures for later periods, but after 2009 we 
witnessed a high increase in the use of mobile phones among the people in 
the Hayre. In that period there was also a change in the technology of mobile 
telephony. Increasingly, people were opting for smartphones. This change 
in technology can be explained by the entrance of Chinese products into the 
market, la chinoiserie and also by the popularization of ICTs that was initiated 
by the Malian government from 2001 onwards. Initiatives to this end were 
the ‘Centre Local d’Information et de Communication’ (CLIC) and a so-called 
e-festival, ‘Festival d’informatique dans les écoles’. Obviously, the policies of the 
main phone companies (Orange and Malitel) also contributed to facilitating 
access to the Internet through mobiles (mobile internet) and Live or fly boxes 
(with wifi networks). All these fairly recent developments allowed people in 
the North to use online networks like Facebook during the conflict. 
The war in the Hayre region6 
While the coup in Bamako took place in mid-March 2012 and the independ-
ence of Azawad territory was proclaimed on 6 April by the MNLA,7 it took 
this group until 13 May (1.5 months later) to formally install themselves in 
Douentza. They did so by occupying the control post at the entrance of the 
city and by surveying the station, the main road and the market. These are 
typically places that are central to communication, exchange and mobility in 
the town. According to some of our informants, the majority of the MNLA 
separatists who occupied Douentza are from native Tuareg factions of the 
area (coming from Bori and Kikara, which are villages in the region). Most of 
the MNLA rebels wore Malian army or police uniforms.8 Paate Tamboura,9 a 
young student originally from Boni, who is studying law at the University of 
Bamako, indicates how the MNLA was initially popular among other nomadic 
groups such as the Fulani: 
Le MNLA has been very well received by the people … On April 3d 
2012, date of its first visit in Douentza. The MNLA has claimed the 
independence of Azawad on April 6th. The state was perceived nega-
tively by the Fulbe nomads because of the multiple fees and taxes to 
which they have been forced to pay as victims of the agents of water 
and forestry and the gendarmerie. With the emergence of MNLA, they 
thought that Azawad would become a state par excellence for nomads 
and that this state would have measures favoring all aspects of nomad 
life. 
However, the symbolic position of Douentza as the ‘frontier of Azawad 
territory’ lasted only 1.5 months. After that it turned into an ungoverned 
‘no-man’s land’. Despite the media attention on the MNLA, the real threat 
came from several Islamist movements (Ansar Diine, MUJAO, and AQIM) 
who, on 26 June, chased the MNLA from Gao and became the new rulers 
of Northern Mali.10 Shortly afterwards, the MNLA also retreated from 
Douentza and left it empty of governmental agents: doctors, teachers, NGO 
personnel, prison guards and the city councillors, most of whom left for 
Bamako.11 The power vacuum in combination with an administrative void12 
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 13. With the closure of 
schools, many pupils 
had to relocate to the 
South. The transitional 
government facilitated 
enrolment of students 
from the North in the 
South.
 14. Sangare (2012c), 
Figure 14. (http://
www.ascleiden.nl/
content/douentza-
sous-occupation-des-
rebelles-du-mnla-
premi%C3%A8re-
s%C3%A9rie).
 15. As in every other 
year, there have been 
violent confrontations 
between Fulbe and 
Dogon in the Douentza 
region. However, this 
year the violence and 
death toll has been 
exceptionally high. See 
for exemple “Nouveau 
bilan: 30 Burkinabés 
tués a la frontière 
avec le Mali dans des 
violences”, 25 Mai 
2012. http://www.
maliweb.net/news/
faits-divers/2012/05/25/
article,69147.html.
 16. De Bruijn & Sangare 
(2012), p. 7: a bag of 
millet (100 kg) was 
sold in 2012 for 32,000 
FCFA, which is twice as 
expensive as the usual 
16,000 FCFA for the 
same product in the 
same month in 2011.
 17. This is the Banque 
Internationale pour le 
Mali (BIM) à Douentza.
 18. Mouvement pour 
l’Unicité et le Jihad 
en Afrique de l’Ouest 
(MUJAO).
 19. The French military 
intervention Serval 
changed name and 
mandate in July 2014, 
and is now referred to 
as ‘Barkhane’.
plunged the Douentzankoobe (inhabitants of Douentza region) into dramas of 
all sorts: formal schooling stopped,13 medical care halted, and uncontrolled 
environmental degradation proceeded unchecked.14 The sick no longer had 
access to medicines, woodcutting went on uncontrolled, and the absence of 
administrators’ mediation in land use conflicts probably explains this year’s 
extremely high number of lethal conflicts.15 On top of that there were the food 
crisis and high inflation, with most prices doubling.16 Following the closure 
of the only bank,17 those families that relied on remittances could now only 
receive support through mobile phone transfers. In contrast to other Northern 
cities, once the MNLA retreated Douentza had not been immediately 
(re)occupied by either the Malian army or the Islamists; as a consequence, it 
literally became a political ‘no-man’s land’ where neither the government nor 
the rebels had a say or claim for more than two months (between June and 
September 2012).
During this power vacuum, insecurity, for the nomads especially, was 
experienced as the problem par excellence in the area. The absence of any 
authority turned Douentza into a lawless, ungoverned no-man’s land. 
Tensions between different ethnic groups (Fulbe, Dogon, Songhay, Tuareg) 
had become more intense and small arms were being traded in high quanti-
ties. The separatists from the MNLA were weakened by Islamists in other 
northern towns. After a period of at least two months of a complete power 
vacuum, Douentza was re-occupied by the sharia-inspired Islamist group 
MUJAO18 on 1 September 2012. In spite of a counter movement called 
Ganda Iso, consisting mainly of Fulani nomads with training received in 
Mopti from the Malian army, the Islamists of the MUJAO conquered them 
overnight. From September onwards, the MUJAO occupied the city. They 
gained people’s trust by providing social services and security. Apparently, 
the Fulbe nomads from the area decided to send their children to the 
MUJAO training camps in the vicinity of Gao, informed by real concerns 
about security and economic survival rather than identification with Islamist 
ideologies. 
The MUJAO left Douentza of their own accord when they heard about the 
French military intervention (Opération Serval) that would start end of 2012. 
Most of them disappeared with their four-wheel drives. 
In what was presented internationally as the ‘battle of re-conquest’ of 
the North, all phone lines were cut for several days in order to smoothen 
Opération Serval.19 It was often only some days after the re-conquest of these 
cities that the GSM network was restored (see Keita 2013a). This confirms 
the significant role of monopolising communication (technologies) in war and 
conflict zones. 
By the end of 2012 and the beginning of 2013 the Hayre had turned 
into a war zone, and to date new actors and networks are being installed. 
Apart from the nomads, the urbanites, Tuareg MNLA fighters, and MUJAO 
jihadists entered the scene, while government officials left the area and 
many inhabitants sought refuge in Mopti, Bamako, or Burkina Faso and 
Mauritania.
In the next section, we investigate how these different social and politi-
cal circles used ICTs in their communication and organization, and how they 
became new information networks for the nomads and for outsiders. We 
also describe how these networks interacted with each other. The focus is, 
however, on where on- and offline distinctions blurred, since we suggest that 
in this complex dynamic new political agency would emerge. 
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 20. The information in this 
section is based on 
information gathered 
by Boukary Sangare, 
who went to the Hayre 
region in April 2012 
and again in November 
2012 (see Sangare 2010).
 21. Interview by Boukary 
Sangare of Hamma 
Diallo, a Fulbe 
commercial trader, in 
Fetesambo, Boni area, 
Douentza province, 
November 2012.
new icts and (dis)connected coMMunication/inforMation 
networks, 2012
Hayre networks and mobile telephony
Continuation in contacts20
During the conflict, existing fears that phone masts would immediately be 
destroyed by rebels turned out to be false assumptions. In Douentza, many 
buildings and shops were looted and destroyed, but the phone masts remained 
intact and we were able to connect to our informants. Obviously, in the course 
of the conflict there were some minor cuts in the mobile phone connections. We 
heard about these occurrences in the surroundings of the small towns Ménaka, 
Goundam, Léré, and Diré shortly after they were conquered by the rebels. 
These cuts were collateral damage of the fighting but they never lasted long. 
Furthermore, none of the regional capital cities (Gao, Tombouctou, Mopti, and 
Kidal) or larger towns (such as Douentza and Gossi) of the northern regions 
suffered for more than two days from these cuts. When the French Opération 
Serval took off in January 2013, there were several moments in which phone 
networks were down. Those who could no longer join their family members in 
the North began to discuss on social media networks like Facebook about the 
possible causes and explanations for these cuts (see below). 
The mobile phone had become an important tool for the inhabitants of 
the Hayre, as a provider of security, to maintain contact with people who had 
fled or were far away, and as a messaging device through which information 
entered and fed the discussions. The phone worked as a tool for security, for 
instance in ensuring the safety of the roads to the market. As underlined by 
Hamma Diallo, a nomadic pastoralist and cattle trader from Boni region, in 
November 201221:
The mobile phone has come in very handy in this period of crisis. 
Thanks to the phone, we could contact our people, before travelling 
somewhere and making sure that everything is ok. If the rebels and/or 
bandits arrived somewhere, people take their phone in order to inform 
those who have travelled.
But probably the most important function of the mobile phone during the 
conflict was to keep people informed, be they friends and family who lived 
in Bamako or those living in other cities as emigrants or refugees. It was both 
for emotional contact and being informed about each other and for the prac-
tical reason of sending money to those in need. This role of migrants in the 
diaspora during the Mali conflict has been overlooked and will be touched 
on below (Gary-Tounkara 2013). The following quote by Boukary Tamboura 
(Fulbe diimaajo and technician of Radio Daande Douwansa), from November 
2012, underlines this argument:
The fact that MNLA did not destruct the phone masts and mobile 
phone networks, was in their proper interest since they themselves 
cannot work without a phone network. This also worked to the advan-
tage of the populations. Bamako, the capital city was informed in real 
time about all that takes place in Douentza by the occupants and as 
such the phone ‘eased’ the emigrants from the Douentza area who live 
elsewhere. They could call their parents and friends everyday to have 
news and know they were still there. 
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Creating information to convince
The phone provided information and images of the ‘enemy’ and/or differ-
ent conflicting parties. At first, the PR machine of the separatist group 
MNLA managed to create a heroic image by posting YouTube films about 
their victories. Illiterate or not, people adored the content of these films. 
Even if they did not have Internet access or smartphones, it sufficed for one 
person to have downloaded the movies from the Net downtown, and then 
these movies were spread at a rapid pace among nomadic Fulbe thanks to 
Bluetooth technology. The Malian government did not have such convinc-
ing and short visual messages for the local populations of the North, and its 
communication strategies were therefore much less efficient (and manipu-
lative?). The MUJAO (and the other militant movements) had clearly also 
developed communication strategies in which circulating videos and vodcasts 
(small films) of their victories through people’s phones was central. For some 
groups (e.g., Fulbe in Douentza region), this contributed to their popular-
ity and sometimes led to the Fulbe’s adherence to the MUJAO (Sangare 
2013b).
The first videos distributed in the region concerned the victories of the 
MNLA against the Malian army in the northern regions, clearly geared to 
highlight the heroic, not least in order to convince local populations that they 
had the capacity to conquer the North. After their defeat by MUJAO, it was 
the videos from Sharia-oriented Islamist groups such as the MUJAO that 
became prominent. Their videos had very anti-Western, anti-Malian and even 
anti-MNLA messages. In addition to the MUJAO, Ansar Diine also engaged 
in anti-MNLA and anti-Azawad slogans. 
But it was not only this propaganda function that the mobile phone 
fulfilled. The MUJAO also used it to create and establish their power base in the 
Hayre. They connected to local populations through mobile phone. Boukary 
observed how MUJAO militants, upon their arrival in Douentza and Boni 
in September 2012, offered the locals access to their personal mobile phone 
numbers, which they could call in case they needed protection and/or assist-
ance. Thus, behind a facade of the politics of war and fear, the MUJAO also 
invested in consolidation, peace and feelings of security. These had not been 
there even before the war. The Fulani nomads especially did not feel protected 
by the state, or secured. These observations from the Douentza region have 
also been reported from Timbuktu, where AQIM distributed phone numbers 
the local population could call in case of problems with bandits or members 
of the MNLA. This is part of the explanation as to why the Jihadists have 
been praised for their social services and work, such as bringing in expen-
sive goods and distributing medicine and SIM cards to the poor. They also 
equipped local religious authorities with cars, money and weapons (Bøås and 
Torheim 2013).
Thus, mobile telephony enabled a continuation of contact between 
family, refugees and migrants. These networks also became linked to 
the information streams sent around by the population and the MUJAO 
or MNLA, thus creating a connection between ethnic groups in which 
networks based on family and friendships intermingled with informa-
tion networks of the MUJAO and the MNLA. In terms of communication 
strategies, neither the state nor NGO circles were as successful in reach-
ing out with online media to the Fulani nomads or to other villagers in the 
region. 
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Diasporas and Northern Mali
Due to the marginalization and underdevelopment of this region, different 
ethnic groups from the Hayre have spread over large geographical spaces by 
emigrating to Equatorial Guinea, Libya, Europe and the United States. The 
influence of this diaspora cannot be underestimated. Some youth in the urban 
centres of the area (Boni, Douentza) have the means to access the Internet 
and partake in exchanges with migrants living far away. 
An example is the Douentza Facebook group that made it possible for the 
youth that grew up in Douentza, but currently live outside of the area, to get 
to know each other, connect to each other and feel free to express themselves. 
Since this Facebook page of the Douentza group is most actively used by 
Fulani youth in the diaspora, it connected the Hayre region almost in real time 
while it was in contact with people living in Bamako, Burkina Faso, Niger, 
Senegal, Morocco, China, the United States and Europe. The manager of the 
group is Ibrahima Cisse, a linguist who has studied in Grenoble and at Leiden 
University. He is from the village of Nokara (next to Douentza) and his family 
is an established part of the small intellectual elite from the area. There are also 
members of the Dicko family from Dalla who live in Bamako and are active in 
these forums. Apart from this, many of the members are students. They discuss 
the actualities in the region and the manifestations of the crisis. Here there was 
a connection between mobile phone information that was gained through calls 
from people from Douentza to people in Bamako who then put this informa-
tion on the Facebook page. Themes and issues for discussion varied according 
to the events in the region. For instance, when the MNLA occupied the Hayre, 
their relationship with the population was discussed. During Opération Serval 
there was panic on this Facebook page as the telephone lines were down and 
no connection with the Hayre was possible.
On the 12th of January 2013, there was a discussion between vari-
ous emigrants from the Douentza area. Their discussion was first 
about the fact that the phone lines were being blocked in Douentza, 
Booni, Hombori for security reasons. But initially no one knew who 
was the instigator of this blocking. Later on, Boukary explains to the 
other members how interim president Dioncounda Traore had given 
a speech on national Television the day before about the detrimental 
impact of rumours that are spread by phone in the fight around Konna. 
The members than suppose this is why the network in Douentza area 
went down and continue a small discussion on how indeed, media can 
have a negative impact on war situations. One of them ends the discus-
sion of that day with the sentence ‘Let’s pray for our families’. Next 
day, 13 January 2013, someone informs the group that certain strate-
gic places in the town of Douentza have been bombarded with preci-
sion by the French. But apparently, there is not too much panic about 
it. They finish off by wishing courage to their family members that are 
now finally freed.
The Facebook group in itself led to new ways of identification, new processes 
of control, and a revival of belonging for those who had left the area, whether 
recently or long ago. It was the conflict and the alarming messages coming out 
of the zone, however, that dramatically intensified the dialogues, connections 
and interactions online between the rural and urban Fulani worldwide. 
Interestingly enough, most if not all members seem to feel very secure in this 
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 22. Phone calls by Lotte 
Pelckmans, 2012.
Internet and digital environment. Everyone posts his/her comments with full 
name and pictures, even if they are highly political.
Deental, an association of people from the Hayre who live in Bamako, 
have informed the diaspora and the intellectuals in the diaspora, through this 
Facebook page, about their humanitarian actions in the region. Also off line 
Deental was very active in political lobbying in Bamako in order to get money 
and humanitarian aid to the region. Their ‘crisis committee’ coordinated 
several actions of aid convoys for the Hayre. Since Deental does not have its 
own website (yet), they used the Douentza group to spread information about 
their actions.
Apart from this Facebook group, the Internet was used mainly to get news 
and information about the crisis. Even though this was on a very modest scale 
and only for those with patience and money to buy airtime, accessing differ-
ent websites was possible for those in Douentza and Boni with smartphones. 
In the interviews Boukary carried out in November 2012, several youth indi-
cated that via youth from Bamako who visited their hometowns, they had 
seen and obtained information from various web- and news sites such as 
Journal Foufou and Journal Afrique 24. This means that even those youth who 
do not have telephones themselves benefit from sharing news and items on 
others’ phones, for example Boukary Sangare’s phone. 
Not only the Internet but also telephone calls played a major role as a 
source of credible information for the diaspora and those residing in Bamako. 
Lotte’s experience illustrates this importance. When Konna (a small but stra-
tegic town near Mopti in Central Mali) was being taken and occupied by the 
Islamists on 10 January 2013, Lotte called some friends and colleagues who are 
from this area.22 While most of them were residing in Bamako, they explained 
how they managed to follow ‘life’ through small films and phone conver-
sations with their family members (cousins, brothers) and friends who had 
stayed in Konna. So, the youth drinking tea in Bamako paid a lot of airtime 
to stay online via telephone in order to overhear the gunshot sounds passing 
through the phones of their friends in Konna. Apart from demonstrating their 
connectedness, it is also about sharing the emotion of online closeness that 
allows a form of co-presence.
About the Hayre: The online practice of academia, journalism  
and war information
Despite relatively high costs for many (educated) urbanites, accessing the 
Internet is a daily/weekly reality ever since it became available in its wire-
less form. The crisis seems to have given a boost to discussing and displaying 
news online. New journals and newspapers have appeared online, such as 
Arawane Express, Malijet, Journal du Mali, and Depêches du Mali. Some blog-
gers, like the academic Bruce Whitehouse with his blog www.bridgesfrom-
bamako.com, have established a reputation and are widely read. Facebook 
was also an important connector for the urbanites to intellectuals and jour-
nalists outside of Mali. Anthropologists living in Mali at the time channelled 
information in real time by mounting Facebook pages (e.g. ‘Americans and 
friends of Mali’ by Stephen Wooten). 
Facebook has also become the privileged social network for the upper-
class Malians residing both in Mali and/or abroad in the diaspora. This 
social medium has been used by many groups and individuals to share 
and discuss information concerning the Mali crisis. Discussion groups 
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such as the ‘Anti-MNLA’, ‘Anti-Négociation’, ‘ATT Alternative’, the ‘Sofas de 
la République’, ‘Journal Foufou’, ‘Douentza Groupe’, and ‘Maliden Kura’ were 
created at the outset of the crisis and helped Malians and others to air their 
frustrations, defend their positions, and learn about those of others (Sangare 
2013a, 2013b). 
We were ourselves participants in the creation of the news around Mali. 
We tried to read as many online publications as possible, followed Facebook 
discussions, and took part in discussions on Internet forums. We published 
some opinion articles on the Internet, and these publications became sources 
for the online communities. However, most of the information came from 
uncorroborated sources and the news creation could be questioned. It is clear 
that the linkage with people on the ground in these forums was rather flimsy. 
Some of the experts had never visited the North and based their information 
on contacts with people in the diaspora and Bamako, who in some instances 
were linked to people on the ground in the North. Another strategy was to 
verify information from closed Facebook groups, where information from 
many sides was moulded into realities that finally entered the newspapers or 
other circuits of information. 
Disconnect
An example of the creation of such ‘flimsy’ news is the encounter of Mirjam 
with a Dutch journalist, who asked her about the situation in the North. 
Despite the fact that Mirjam had passed on Boukary’s contact details, the jour-
nalist consulted only the usual circle of main informants; he did not contact 
Boukary, who had first-hand information, and although the journalist tried to 
travel to the North, he could not reach beyond Mopti. These experiences filled 
the Dutch newspapers, and were in themselves interesting stories and analy-
ses, but the foundation of these stories is questionable. The analyses centred on 
the jihadists and Muslims in the North, whom the journalist never got to meet, 
and concluded with claims on the broader picture of terrorists in the Sahel. 
This example shows the gap between local dynamics and international 
information circuits. Another example is how the media reported their under-
standing of the MUJAO. While locally many citizens in the North were in 
favour of the MUJAO, such local views were not represented in the images 
portrayed by Western media. On the contrary, in these media, the MUJAO and 
Ansar Diine were often represented as mere as mere ‘bad guys’ who engage 
in Islamic terrorism, cutting off hands, and so on. Many citizens in Douentza 
were pleased with the arrival of the MUJAO because at least they managed 
to put an end to the anarchy in the area. The MUJAO was perceived as an 
organization bringing security rather than violence and threats. Obviously, 
inhabitants of Douentza did not appreciate all aspects of the MUJAO’s policy, 
such as the strict separation of women and men, for example, in schools, and 
the fact that youngsters were no longer permitted to listen to their favour-
ite music on their phones. Probably the fact that the MUJAO disposed of a 
lot of money made their actions more easily accepted. Youngsters who lived 
together were paid to undergo religious marriages, and cigarette traders were 
recompensed if they committed to stop trading such illicit and immoral goods. 
The people who cooperated with the MUJAO were not always ideologically 
inclined to sharia law; very often they were young and frustrated, but they had 
finally found among the MUJAO fighters ears that listened to them and hands 
that fed them.
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discussion: eMerging PoLiticaL agency in the hayre
In his seminal book Smart Mobs (2002), Rheingold established a relationship 
between access to information and political activism. Others followed his line 
of reasoning, especially those describing events that were related to what 
was later labelled in the media the ‘Arab spring’ (Fahlenbrach et al. 2014a; 
Zuckerman 2013; www.globaluprisings.org; http://www.warandmedia.org). 
The Mali case is an example of how this relationship between information 
and political activism has played out in sub-Saharan Africa. Below we will 
analyse our presented data. What new networks had been established, and 
how have old networks intensified both on- and offline during the war in 
Mali in 2012? 
As is clear from the data presented, a new communication landscape 
emerged in Mali in 2012 due to the increased spread of wireless technology. 
Information circulated between the on- and offline spaces that increasingly 
belong to the social spaces the people from the Hayre engage with. 
These observations tie in with a general debate on the ‘effects’ of the new 
online spaces on sociality in society. The central question in this debate (and 
in our study) is: how do discussions in both spaces mutually influence each 
other, and how are they intermingled? In research co-ordinated by Mirjam in 
Southern, West and Central Africa, the question of the relation between on- 
and offline actions became very visible when in 2010 Chadian youth started to 
relate to Facebook. Their political ideas were thought to be safe in this space, 
and they felt free (for the first time) to express themselves politically. However, 
the concrete consequences are still to be seen (see Seli 2013; de Bruijn et al. 
2013). Fahlenbrach et al. (2014b) suggest that political action emerges where 
the two worlds meet. Others argue that it creates mainly online passivism – 
for example, that it does not lead to political action, but rather to online 
passivism, also called clicktivism (Cash 2013; Butler 2012). Yet others consider 
the on- and offline worlds as a single space (see Miller 2013). Georgiadou 
et al. (2013) add the important element of the activism of the people involved: 
there needs to be a cause to fight for. Finally, there are those who describe 
conflicting and varying strands of activism within the online world. This is 
what Mutsvairo (2013) showed with his thesis on online activism linked to 
Zimbabwean politics. He observed that online activism led by the diaspora 
is not much visited by people living in Zimbabwe. Therefore, the calls for 
action by the diaspora on blogs, online discussion groups and Facebook pages 
have not materialized on the ground. Other studies show that actions in the 
offline world have been facilitated by new communication tools. For instance, 
the possibilities to use the SMS group services of mobile phones did make 
a difference in the recruitment of people in Nigeria. SMS messages turned 
the people into a connected online-offline space (see Ekine 2010; Obadare 
2006). In the Hayre, both mechanisms are at work. Information flows within 
the online and offline spaces, and, as we have shown, these spaces meet in 
some instances and not in others. From the cited studies, we can conclude 
that there needs to be a connection between on- and offline to enable (effec-
tive) political agency to emerge.
The war situation in the Hayre brought new actors and networks to the 
region. First the MNLA and later the MUJAO took the position of information 
providers and were also central subjects of information flows. Other existing 
networks in the Hayre regained momentum during the crisis. Such was the 
case for the Fulani families who have been dispersed owing to the conflict. 
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Although mobility and dispersal is a phenomenon that is familiar to the Fulani 
nomads, it was exacerbated on an involuntary basis by the conflict and inse-
curity made more people leave the region in search of safer pastures. 
Early in 2012 the usual information network that consisted of administra-
tors and civil servants disappeared when they left the region out of fear of the 
‘rebel’ groups. It was more or less replaced by another network, namely, that 
of academics, intellectuals and journalists, but also the diaspora members in 
Bamako, who gathered and exchanged in cyberspace. These networks have 
varying levels of access to new media and also have a different capability 
to use them. The Fulani herders are connected by mobile phone, as are the 
MUJAO, who can opt out and retreat into regions without wireless connectiv-
ity (for now). The academics/journalists have a significant online presence, but 
they lack an offline presence on the ground; it is the group of Hayrankoobe 
who live in Bamako and further away who have both online connections with 
the people in the Hayre through the Internet (Facebook) and offline connec-
tions through direct exchanges of travellers and via mobile phone. These 
circles overlap. Probably the most remarkable are the intersections between 
Fulani herdsmen and the MUJAO (also via film), and the overlap between 
Fulani urban youth and the diaspora/Bamako Fulani (an example was the 
Deental group and the Facebook groups [Douentza]). The networks and their 
intersections are represented in Figure 2. 
If we apply the hypothesis formulated above suggesting that most political 
action takes place where the different forms of information networks meet, 
i.e. off and online, for our case this would mean that the Deental group has 
increased its political potential as activists for development of the Hayre region 
thanks to online exchanges. Indeed, the interconnection created on Facebook, 
integrated with information gathered through mobile phone contacts, was the 
direct reason for the emergence of Deental as an action group. Its strength, 
however, also relied on the grounding of this group in connection between the 
members, based on ethnicity and geographical attachment. Both Fulaniness 
and the Hayre were the important markers to make it work. Ties through 
family, friendship, and ethnicity were those of the past, but they regained 
momentum in this period and with the possibilities to connect. 
The meeting of Fulani nomads and the MUJAO in the mobile phone 
on/offline space and offline also created a new linkage. The Fulani herds-
men were triggered by the absence of the state and by their experience of 
being neglected/marginalized to embrace the new ideology and actions of 
the MUJAO. They sent their children to the (offline) training camps and in 
general were positive about these new actors in their region. Watching the 
PR videos and listening to the preaching of the leaders reinforced their shared 
identity in Islam but foremost their common ‘hatred’ for the Malian govern-
ment and state services. They, of course, were also triggered by the economic 
benefits and the simple fact that they experienced a certain form of security, 
both very much offline experiences. It is interesting to realize that the discon-
nected circle, the online group of intellectuals and diaspora, live in their own 
world, where a completely different interpretation was presented of the Fulani 
herdsmen who moved towards the MUJAO. It must be admitted that this 
online community had many of the characteristics of a bubble. It is disap-
pointing to realize that analysts in policy circles and among journalists, and 
also intellectuals and academic researchers, are all largely dependent on this 
kind of ‘information bubble’ when they find themselves faced with a locale 
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that has been turned into a war situation and when it is simply too dangerous 
to go into the area and work on the ground. 
To conclude: Does new political agency emerge in the interplay between 
new ICT and war dynamics? In the case of the Hayre, we have seen new 
information flows emerging and intensification of existing networks with new 
information content; outside the Hayre the diaspora/migrants have found new 
activities and recreated their linkage with their Hayre or Fulani identity/ethnic-
ity. New information networks do emerge, both on- and offline. They become 
sources of information, and they are based on an urge from the network partic-
ipants to receive information in order to fight for the cause they (re)define. It 
would require another article to show how the online information created in 
the bubble of journalists, academics and groups in the diaspora feed into other 
information circles, circles that then create the news. If these newly appearing 
networks, or lineages between networks, based on older forms do also lead 
to political agency we cannot answer on the basis of the analysis of the year 
2012 alone. This would require a follow-up of political actions in the region. 
However, we can say that the potential for new actions is present.
In this article we focused on the creation of new information networks 
around the Fulani nomads and urban youth and how these connected to 
both on- and offline news networks with the MUJAO and in urbanites 
outside the Hayre, in the south of Mali and in some West African countries. 
These interrelated networks of on- and offline information flows created a 
new space for nomads and youth to (re)invent their political agency. The 
interactivity of media (Hepp 2013) and the combination of different ICTs 
(Madianou and Miller 2012) are part of the explanation, but it is foremost 
Figure 2: Information Circuits: (dis)connected on-and off-line networks.
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the possibilities that new ICTs offer to the communication space of the 
Hayrankoobe and the decisions of the Hayrankoobe to engage with these 
media – because they had/have a cause to fight for – that has been decisive 
in this process. Both urban youth and nomads seem to follow their histories 
of networking and communication in a space that was stimulated by the war 
environment. The way they integrate new information flows into the prac-
tice of their political agency is an intriguing process that should be followed 
in the coming years. 
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